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Abstract
This paper examines the welfare consequences of changing the current
U.S. income tax system to a progressive consumption tax. We compute a
sequence of single period equilibria in which savings decisions depend on
the expected future return to capital. In the presence of existing income
taxes, the U.S. economy is assumed to lie on abalanced growth path. With the
change to a consumption tax, individuals save more and initially consume less.
As the capital stock grows, consumption eventually overtakes that of the
orginal path, and the economy approaches the new balanced growth path with
higher consumption and a greater capital stock. Both the transition and the
balanced growth paths enter our welfare evaluations. We find that the dis-
counted present value of the stream of net gains is approximately $650 billion
in 1973 dollars, just over one percent of the discounted present value of
national income. Larger gains occur if further reform of capital income
taxation accompanies the change. We examine the sensitivity of the results,
both to the design of the consumption tax and to the values of elasticity
and other parameters. The paper also contains estimates of the time required
to adjust from one growth path to the other.
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In this paper, a change from the current U.S. income tax to apro-
gressive consumption tax is evaluated using a dynamic general equilibrium
model of the U.S. economy and tax system. This model includes endogenous
household savings behavior, where savings in any period depend on the
expected future return to capital. The U.S. economy is assumed to be on
a balanced growth path in the presence of existing income taxes as repre-
sented by 1973 data. The behavior of the economy under a progressive con-
sumption tax is modelled in terms of a sequence of equilibria involving a
transition to a new balanced growth path.
This sequenced general equilibrium model can be used to shed light on
recent debates in the tax incidence literature. In static equilibrium models
like that of Harberger (1962), plausible parameter values suggest that
capital bears the full burden of capital income taxation. In steady state
models, Feldstein (1974) and Grieson (1975) compare the growth path with a
profits tax to one with a wage tax. They find that labor can be better off
with the wage tax because the higher capital stock increases the gross wage
by more than the tax rate. These opposing results are reconciled by Boadway
(1979), who calculates that considerable time may be required to move from
one path to the other. The switch from a profits tax to a wage tax or consump-
tion tax can be expected to reduce net wages or consumption initially. Depend-
ing on the savings elasticity, the capital stock can eventually grow to the
point where all can be made better off. In at least one of Boadway's examples,
the net wage remained higher under the profits tax for 65 years. Depending
On the discount rate, labor/consumers may or may not prefer elimination of
capital taxation. Bernheim (1981) found considerable sensitivity to savings
parameters and the discount rate, as do we in results below.—2—
Our model contains 12 income groups, each endowed with some labor
and capital. In order to measure the relative efficiency of different
tax policies, we compute a dynamic analogue of compensating variatipns
for each household group and sum these to give an aggregate measure.
Since the model incorporates several tax systems and a labor/leisure
choice, the move to a consumption tax is not equivalent to full restora-
tion of Pareto optimality. In spite of second—best considerations, our
results indicate significant gains from such a switch. On an annualized
equivalent basis, these gains are in the region of one percent of
national income. Larger potential annualized equivalent gains accrue
from removing further distortions.
The next section reviews some of the arguments typically made for the
switch to consumption taxation. Section 3 summarizes our general equilibrium
model, while Section 4 gives special attention to our treatment of endogenous
factor supplies. Specific proposals are converted into model equivalent
form in Section 5, and simulation results are presented in Section 6. A
final section summarizes our conclusions.
2. The Progressive Consumption Tax
The idea of taxing consumption rather than income has a long history.
it is frequently credited to Mill, but more recent advocates include Fisher
(1942), Kaldor (1957), Feldstein (1978), and Bradford (1980). The efficiency
argument in favor of such a change is that it would remove intertemporal
distortions associated with the income tax. Post—income—tax earnings can be
saved or consumed, but the return to savings is further taxed before consump-
tion can occur in future periods. This double taxation can be removed by
switching to a proportional or progressive tax on labor income only or on all
income with complete deductibility of savings.—3—
This double taxation issue is usually explained in terms of a two—
period consumption diagram. The income tax changes the slope of the no-tax
budget constraint, favoring consumption today over consumption tomorrow.
With nonzero substitution, this price change results in a deadweight loss,
but because of offsetting price and income effects it may or may not result
in reduced savings. As recent literature has highlighted, however, the
main problem created by the income tax is not just the deviation from condi-
tions for exchange efficiency as suggested by this two period diagram. Inter—
temporal consumer prices for consumption today and tomorrow also do not equal
intertemporal producer prices. This deviation from conditions for general
efficiency typically causes the economy to be on a growth path where sub—
optimal savings occur.
If we assume the economy is on a balanced growth path in the presence
of an existing income tax, the initial impact of a switch to a progressive
consumption tax would typically be to increase savings and reduce con-
sumption. When balanced growth is again achieved, the higher savings
result in a capital stock that is higher than under the income tax. The
consumption profile following a switch to a consumption tax would at first
be below that associated with the income tax, but would eventually exceed
it. Initially, instantaneous welfare is reduced, but it grows as the economy
approaches a new balanced growth path with higher consumption. In a model
with no other distortions and with a ccmplete set of contingent coimnodity
markets (or equivalently, perfect foresight), such a change must be welfare
improving since it involves a move to a Pareto optimal allocation. The
time profile for consumption is shown in Figure 1. Levhari and Sheshinski
(1972) discuss similar consumption profiles and provide analytical inter—
temporal welfare measures similar to the type we compute.—4—
Figure 1
Consumption Profiles Under a Simple
Income Tax and Consumption Tax
log C steady state path with a consumption
tax and a higher capital stock
transition path
steady state path
with an income tax
time
time of the switch from the income
tax to the consumption tax
Vertically hashed area represents instantaneous welfare loss.
Horizontally hashed area represents instantaneous welfare gain.
Our objective is to evaluate the net gain or loss to the U.S. economy
from making an income—consumption tax switch. The presumption for a net
gain mentioned above does not automatically follow in this model for a
number of reasons, although such a result remains likely. Our model incorpo-
rates other distortions from the tax systein,' the sequenced equilibrium
approach involves myopic expectations rather than perfectforesight,' and,
in the presence of a labor—leisure choice, both income and consumption taxes
are distorting.--" We also use a multi—consumer model which necessitates
aggregating over the separate consumer gains or losses, an important departure
from much of the theoretical work on this issue.
In addition to interteniporal efficiency, the consumption tax has been
supported on ground of intersectoral efficiency. If all assets are given
——5-.
the same consumption tax treatment, welfarecan be improved through the
more efficient use of a given capital stock. Thisargument may favor the
consumption tax over the current U.S. personal andcorporate tax system, but
not necessarily over a comprehensive income tax ata uniform rate. Thirdly,
the consumption tax is often supported on thephilosophical grounds that
it is more equitable to taxwithdrawalsfrom theeconomy in the form of con-
sumption than it is to tax contributions to theeconomy in the form of factor
supplies.
Finally, the consumption tax has been supported on administrativegrounds.
Because of the difficulty of taxing expenditures ofindividuals as they occur,
most proposals have opted for a consumption tax operatedas an income tax with
a savings deduction. The U.S. Treasury's Blueprints for Basic TaxReform (1977)
introduces the concept of a "qualified account," with therequirement that
all financial savings which qualify for a tax deductionmust feed through
such an account. With a redistributjve tax on allexpenditures, the need
no longer arises for separate corporate, capital gains, and wealth transfer
taxes. Interest, dividends, and sales of corporate stockmay remain in
the account, untaxed until withdrawn andspent. The tax base is easily
measured since it only includes labor and rental income and withdrawls from
the qualified account.±1 This device has a comparativeadvantage in an
inflationary economy since it completely avoids the need to define real
income or measure economic depreciation: whatever the incometo an account,
the tax is based on nominal withdrawals in the sameyear. Similarly, the
need to tax inheritances under the Haig—Simons concept disappears,--"although
there remains the issue of whether transfers at death are to be taxedas
consumption.
Whilefinancialassets receive a consumption tax treatment through the
"qualified account," other assets receive equivalent treatment through the—6—
"prepayment" approach. Outlays for durables and housing would not qualify
for a tax deduction, but the imputed service stream from these assets
would not appear as taxable expenditure. If the durable's purchase price
equals the present value of imputed net rents, then a tax on the acquisition
price has the same present value as a tax on rents as they accrue. The
model incorporates both types of vehicles, for the existing tax system
as well as for the expanded savings deductions under a progressive con—
6/
sumption tax.—
3. A General Equilibrium Model of the U.S. Economy: Structure and Data
In order to investigate the possible impacts of the adoption of a
progressive consumptIon tax, we have used a dynamic numerical general
equilibrium model of the U.S. economy and tax system. In any period of
the equilibrium sequence, savings are endogenously dependent on the expected
future return to capital. Expectations are myopic in the sense that investors
expect current prices to prevail in future periods. Savings result in
increments to the economy—wide capital stock in the next period, and different
sequences of equilibrium prices and quantities are traced out for alternative
policy regimes. Policy appraisal proceeds by comparing the resulting con-
sumption profiles.
The general equilibrium model stresses the interactive nature of the
price mechanism in jointly determining the behavior of all producers and
consumers in each market of the economy. Such a model is needed to appraise
tax policy changes which are of sufficient magnitude to cause interactive
effects throughout the economy. Since it is not based on differential
calculus, the model can handle a number of large distortions and measure
discrete changes in any number of them without linearity assumptions and
without ignoring income effects. There can be any number of sectors and—7
agents, and any specification of demand so long as it satisfies Wairas' Law.
To keep the focus of the paper on results and policy implications,
only a brief overview of ixdel Structure is given hereP' In any single
period, there are 19 producer good industries that use capital and labor in
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) value—added production functions.
They also use the outputs of other industries through an Input/Output matrix
with fixed coefficients. Tax rates on labor for each industry are derived
by taking payroll taxes as a proportion of labor income, while tax rates
on capital for each industry are derived by taking corporate income and
property taxes as a proportion of capital income. Each of these 19 producer
goods are used directly by government, for export, and for investment goods,
but indirectly for consumption through a fixed—coefficient "Z" matrix of
transition into 15 consumer goods with suitable definitions for consumer
demands. This transition is necessary because the goods classification
of consumer expenditure data is different from the output of the 19 pro-
duction sectors. There are 12 consumer groups, differentiated by income
class, each with an initial endowment of capital and labor. As discussed
below, consumers maximize utility defined over the 15 current consumer goods,
current leisure, and anticipated future consumption. The price of future
consumption depends inversely on the expected rate of return (which equals
the current rate of return). The resulting demand for future consumption is
translated into current desired savings. The latter is, in turn, translated
into a vector of investment demands for the 19 industry outputs.
Government collects taxes from both the production and demand sides of
the economy and uses the revenue in a balanced budget to purchase producer
goods via Cobb—Douglas demand functions, to make direct transfer payments
to consumers, and to subsidize government enterprises. A simple trade
sector closes the model.- 8—
The 1973 data for this model are derived from five major sources
including the July 1976 Survey of Current Business, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis Input—Output matrix, unpublished worksheets of the U.S. Conirnerce
Department's National Income Division, the U.S. Labor Department's 1973
Consumer Expenditure Survey, and the U.S. Treasury Department's Merged Tax
File. Because the data set for this model is so comprehensive, the sources
are necessarily divergent. In order to use all of these data together,
adjustments are made to ensure that each part is consistent with the rest.
Alldataon industry and government uses of factors are taken to be fixed,
while data on consumers' factor incomes and expenditures are correspondingly
adjusted. Tax receipts, transfers, and government endowments are fixed,
and government expenditures are scaled to balance their budget. Similar
adjustments ensure that supply equals demand for all goods and factors.
The fully consistent data set defines a single period benchmark
equilibrium in transactions terms. Value observations are separated into
prices and quantities by assuming that a physical unit of a good or factor
is the amount that sells for one dollar. All benchmark equilibrium prices
are $1, and observed values are benchmark quantities.
The equilibrium conditions of the model are then used to determine
behavioral equation parameters consistent with the benchmark data set. This
procedure calibrates the model to the benchmark data in the sense that bench-
mark data can be reproduced as an equilibrium solution to the model before
any policy changes are considered. In order to implement this we specify
exogenous elasticities of substitution between capital and labor in each
industry. We also specify labor supply and savings elasticities to which
substitution elasticities in preferences are calibrated. Factor employ-
ments by industry are used to derive production function weights, and
expenditure data are used to derive utility function weights. This calibra——9—
tion procedure allows for a test of the solution and ensures that the various
agents behaviors are mutually consistent in our benchmark data before
we evaluate policy changes.
Through their interaction, utility—maximizing consumers and profit—
maximizing producers are assumed to reach a single period competitive
equilibrium where all profits are zero and supply equals demand for each
good and factor. Starting with data on endowments, tax rates, preferences,
and production parameters, we use Merrill's (1972) algorithm, a revised
version of Scarf's (1973) algorithm, to calculate prices that satisfy these
conditions at each point in time. Single period equilibria are sequenced
through endogenous savings decisions which augment the capital stock of the
economy. An exogenous labor force growth rate is assumed.
For the benchmark sequence, we calculate a balanced growth path that
begins with our replicated data, has constant prices, and implies quantities
that all grow at the labor force growth rate. We then alter tax parameters
and calculate a revised sequence of equilibria. A higher net return to
capital implies more savings, capital growth, and a transition with an
asymptotic approach to a new balanced growth path. The model assumes no
involuntary unemployment of factors. Markets are perfectly competitive with
no externalities, quantity constraints, or barriers to factor mobility.
Since we compute a complete set of prices and quantities under alternative
tax policies, we can estimate the change in national income, utility or
income changes for each group, and all new factor allocations among industries.
4. The Treatment of Endogenous Factor Supplies
An aspect of the model which is especially important for the analysis
of the consumption tax is the incorporation of endogenous factor supplies.— 10
Consumer decisions regarding factor supplies are made jointly with their
consumption decisions. Each household at any point in time has a nested






where H is the instantaneous utility function defined over currentconsumption
commodities X. and leisure £,thefunction U determines the allocation between
consumption—cum—lejsure and expected future consumption,Cf. Current con-
sumption commodities X. are aggregated using a Cobb—Douglas function, whereas
both U and H are constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. Because
of our myopic expectations assumption, the current rate of return and other
current prices are all that are required to formulate a budget in terms of
prices for present and future consumption. Budget-constrained maximization
of U then results in a desired Cf which can be used to Imply current desired
savings.
In calibrating the model, the parameters of the functions U and H are
determined so as to be consistent with the benchmark data set and to be
consistent with labor supply and savings elasticity estimates from the litera-
ture. Because observed 1973 expenditures and savings differ among the 12
income classes in the model, weighting parameters in the Cobb—Douglas and
CES functions will also differ.
There is considerable controversy regarding the magnitude of the unconi—
pensated elasticity of saving with respect to the real after—tax rate of
return. For a long time the consensus appeared to favor a zero value for
this elasticity, a proposition that was termed Denison's Law due to Denison
(1958). In more recent work, Boskin (1978) has estimated this elasticity to
be approximately 0.4, although Howrey and Hynians (1980) have re—examined— 11—
Boskin'sestimates and suggest that a value closer to zero would bemore
realistic. On ther other hand, Summers (1981) derivessavings elasticities
between 1.5 and 3.0 by attaching plausiblemagnitudes to the parameters of
a life cycle model. We use the 0.4 estimate in our centralcase, but we
test the sensitivity of our results to a widerange of elasticity estimates.
There also exists a number of different estimates for theuncompensated
elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real net—of—taxwage. A
consensus finding from Gregg Lewis (1975) is that the uncompensatedelasticity
for working age males lies in the range of —0.1 to—0.2, with a midpoint
estimate of _0.15.!1 The estimates for labor supply elasticities offemales
and older males constrast with these, are onaverage significantly positive,
and in some cases are larger than one. We assumean identical value for
all income groups in the model, and +0.15 is chosenas an appropriate weighted
average over the econometric estimates for males and females.2' We also
assume a labor endowment equal to 7/4 of the labor supply in the benchmark
equilibrium, reflecting an assumption that 40 hours are typically worked out
of a possible 70—hour week.
To derive the steady state growth rate for the benchmark equilibrium
sequence, we compare the amount of observed 1973 savings to the capital
stock in the benchmark data set. We then assume that the effective units
of labor grow at the same rate. Though labor endowmentsgrow at this fixed
2.89 percent annual rate in both the benchmarksequence and the simulated
sequence, endogenous demand for leisure implies that actual labor supply
will differ. Though the capital stock grows at the same 2.89percent rate
in the benchmark sequence, endogenous saving implies that capital in the
simulation will grow at a different rate.
The 2.89 percent labor growth rate is also assumed equally divided
between Harrod—neutral technical change and population growth. Our welfare— 12—
measuresof tax changes are adjusted to account only for the initial popula-
tion. If total population were included in welfare calculations, the importance
of future periods would be sensitivie to population growth.
A final important parameter is the real net—of—tax rate of return to
capital in the benchmark data. Since this value is used to calibrate prefer-
ence parameters under the assumption of intertemporal utility maximization,
it also determines the rate of time preference in the benchmark sequence of
equilibria. Following recent literature we use 4 percent for the average
value of this parameter, but each income class receives a net—of—tax return
that depends on its own marginal tax rate. We test other values for sensitivity.
5. Representing Consumption Tax Plans in Model Equivalent Form
We consider a number of alternative plans for adopting a progressive
consumption tax as the major broadly based U.S. tax source. In order to
evaluate each plan in the model, it must first be represented in model
equivalent form. Each plan is treated as a variation on the existing income
tax, represented as a set of linear tax functions.
For each of the 12 consumer classes, we have data on the taxes collected
in 1973, the income for that year, and the effective marginal tax rate. With
this information, the tax schedule for each group is modelled as a linear
income tax reflecting both the average and the marginal rate faced by the
group in 1973. This treatment captures the facts that average and marginal
tax rates differ by group, that both are increasing, and that it is the
marginal tax rate which causes the distortionary substitution effects of the
income tax system. Oneshortcomingof our treatment is that consumers do
not move into higher marginal tax brackets if they experience a large increase
in real income. For each consumer class the income tax function is— 13—
T.=B.+tjTI.), (2)
where r is the marginal tax rate and TI. is the taxable income of the th
group. The B. intercept is derived such that observed income and observed
marginaltax rates yieldobserved 1973 taxes paid for each group.
Taxable income TI. in the benchmark is less than }iaig—Simons income
for two major reasons. First, a significant amount of savings flowthrough
private, state, local, or Federal government pension plans, through Keogh
and Individual Retirement (IRA) Accounts, or through cash value life insurance
policies. These are either taxed on a deferral basis (where both the initial
contribution and the return are sheltered but the payouts are fully taxed)
or on a prepayment basis (where the initial contribution is taxed but the
return and payout are tax—free). It is simple to show that the two methods
are identical except that the tax rate at the time of withdrawal may be
different from the rate at the time of contribution.
Flow of Funds (1976) data indicate that in recent years approximately
30 percent of savings flow through these vehicles and are thus taxed on
a consumption basis. Our ndel captures the tax—sheltered nature of these
forms of saving by allowing households to deduct 30 percent of savings in
our calculations for the current tax policy.'
Second, for the existing income tax, different fractions of different
typesof capital income are taxable. Due tothe $100 dividend exclusion,
for example, only 96 percent of dividends are taxed by the personal income
tax. The 50 percent exclusion of nominal realized capital gains in 1973 implied
that 73percent of real accrued capital gains were effectively fully taxed.
For owner—occupied housing, none of the imputed net return is subject to
tax. These proportions are further explained in Fullerton, King, Shoven,
and Whalley (1981).— 14—
Accordingto the Flow of Funds accounts, roughly 20 percent of net
savings are made in the form of net accumulation of owner—occupied housing.
This form of saving receives a consumption tax treatment through the "pre-
payment" approach discussed above. With 20 percent of savings in owner—
occupied housing and an additional 30 percent in tax—deductible savings
vehicles, the current U.S. tax system is roughly halfway between an income
tax and a consumption tax already. Our model captures this complexity in
current U.S. tax law as well as the allocation effects of allowing con—
suniption tax treatments for only some investments.
Because each industry has different proportions of capital income in
the form of dividends, interest, and capital gains, each has a different propor-
tion of capital income that is taxable by the personal income tax. For
this reason, the personal income tax on the taxable fraction of capital
income is collected at the industrial level at rate t,theweighted average
household marginal income tax rate. The weights for Iareproportional to
capital ownership. These taxes, which we term"perscnal factor taxes' act
as a withholding system and capture the industrial discrimination and
resulting reallocation of resources inherent in the present tax system. On
the consumer side of the model, a tax is paid at rate (r. —r)on that amount
of capital income which is fully taxable. That is, the consumer pays additional
taxes or gets a refund depending on whether his marginal taxrate exceeds or
isless than r. Thus, actual taxes paid on capital income vary according
to the marginal tax rates of the various groups.
Inorder to incorporate a consumption tax into the model, we begin with
existing values of B. and r. and allow an increased deduction for savings.
The maintenance of the existing B. and t,,however,would imply a reduction
intax revenues in 1973under a cor.sumption tax.Given that government— 15—
purchasesand transfer payments play such a major role both in the actual
U.S. economy and in our model, tax effects can only be separated from the
expenditure impacts if real government revenues are maintained. The form
of yield equality we impose is that the time path of government receipts
must be the same for all tax alternatives. We examine three separate
approaches:(1) imposing lump—sum taxes or transfers on consumers, pro-
portional to initial incomes and effected by changing the zero income
intercept in the linear income tax function for each consumer; (2) raising
all marginal tax rates by adding the same number of percentage points
to each; (3) multiplying all marginal tax rates by an endogenously deter-
mined constant. In eachcase, the scalar is determined so as to generate
sufficient funds for government expenditures.
The lump—sum case abstracts from the efficiency effects of the replace-
ment tax, and it isolates the effects of the consumption tax change alone.
This may not be realistic, however, since potential replacement taxes are
generally distorting. Additive and multiplicative scaling are more realistic,
but have different effects on the income distribution. Since high income
individuals save more, the consumption tax may have regressive effects
unless the tax rates of high income groups are scaled more.
In our evaluation of consumption tax alternatives, we have examined
eight different tax modification packages. The features of each of these
are shown in Table 1. Since we model the sheltering of imputed net returns
to housing at the industry level, and since saving in housing amounts to 20
percent of total net saving, a complete move to an expenditure tax would
mean that the remaining 80 percent of net saving should be deductible from
the personal income tax base. Plan 1, labeled consumption tax, raises































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to80 percent. This policy could be accomplished by greatly liberalizing
existing Keogh and IRAsavingsvehicles.
The second plan involves the integration of corporate and personal
income taxes via the partnership method)' With this plan, the present
system of taxing a fraction of realized nominal capital gains is also
modified so that real gains are fully taxed as they accrue. The third
plan is the consumption tax (80 percent of savings deductible) combined
with corporate tax integration. The fourth plan corresponds most closely
to the theoretical consumption tax in that all income is taxed (including
the imputed income from housing), while all savings are deductible. The
separate corporate income tax is eliminated with this plan. Plan 5
represents a partial movement towards a consumption tax, where the 55
percent savings deduction represents a point halfway between the current
deduction of 30 percent and the Plan 1 deduction of 80 percent. In Plan
6, all savings are deductible, but the existing preference on income from
housing and the corporate income tax are retained. Plans 7 and 8 investi-
gate whether the present U.S. system, a hybrid of an income tax and a
consumption tax, is better or worse than a pure income tax. A pure
income tax would remove the special treatment of capital gains, tax the
imputed income to owner—occupants, and eliminate shelters offered by
pension funds and other retirement savings vehicles. While savings would
be taxed more heavily, much of the inter—industry distortion of the present
tax system would be eliminated. In Plan 7, a pure income tax replaces the
existing income tax. Plan 8 goes further and also removes the corporate
income tax.— 18—
6.Results
For each of the tax alternatives the new sequence of equilibria has
been computed. For each of the 12 consumer classes we have calculated the
present values of their compensating variations over time using individual
discount rates which are based on the model's 14 percent average after—tax
rate of return to capital in 1973. These welfare estimates are to be
interpreted as the income change in 1973 dollars which would permit that
group to obtain the same pattern of instantaneous utility over time under
the new tax regime as under the o1d)-" Strictly speaking, a welfare
improving change produces a negative compensating variation. However, we
adopt the sign convention that a positive entry indicates a welfare improv-
ing change and a negative entry a welfare reducing change. The instantaneous
utility derives from current consumption and leisure, excludes expected
future consumption from savings of that period, and corresponds to H of
equation (1). This procedure avoids double counting when the next periods
current consumption is added. The individual results are summed over the
12 groups and are presented in Table 2.
The consumption tax (Plan 1) involves an efficiency gain of $686
billion if the revenue shortfall caused by the additional saving deductions
is made up using the lump—sum income tax intercepts. The gain is reduced
to $621 billion if marginal tax rates are increased in a multiplicative
manner and to $636 billion if an additive surtax is applied to the marginal
rates. Some of the potential efficiency gain is lost because of the distort-
ing effects of the higher marginal rates with multiplicative and additive
scaling." The figures in parentheses in Table 2 give the efficiency gain
of each of our plans as a fraction of the present value of future expanded
national income (estimated at 50 trillion). This includes current consump-
tion and leisure valued at the net of tax wage, and it corresponds to the— 19
TABLE 2
DYNAMIC WELFARE EFFECTS IN PRESENT VALUE OF
COMPENSATING VARIATIONS OVER TIME
(in billions of 1973 dollars)a



































































aThe numbersin parentheses represent the gain as a percentage of the present
discounted value of consumptionplusleisure in the base sequence. This number is
$49.863 trillion for all comparisons,andaccounts for only the initial population.— 20—
dollarsneeded for instantaneous utility H. The gain under Plan 1 with
the lump—sum adjustments for revenue replacement is 1.4 percent of the
present discounted value of the future national income (including the value
of leisure). Since high income groups have the largest savings deductions,
multiplicative scaling might be preferred on equity grounds. However,
efficiency gains for multiplicative scaling are typically smaller than
those for additive scaling. The welfare costs of labor/leisure distortions
depend on the square of the marginal tax rate, and multiplicative scaling
adds more to the already high rates of high income consumers.
Results regarding corporate income tax integration are presented for
Plan 2 in Table 2. With a lump—sum replacement the windfall gain for the
economy is larger than that of the move to a consumption tax, but with the
alternative replacements the gain is smaller. Our estimates indicate that
the present value of the gain is $732 billion with lump—sum replacement taxes
and $399 billion with multiplicative increases in marginal rates. The third
plan combines the features of 1 and 2, and our estimates suggest that the
efficiency improvement is approximately additive. The combined tax changes
were advocated in Blueprints and offer a present value efficiency gain of $1
trillion or more.
Since 80 percent of total savings are deductible and 20 percent of total
savings flow into tax favored housing, these plans capture the intertemporal
effects of a full consumption tax. However, since any savings can be used
for housing, these plans leave an intersectoral distortion in favor of
owner—occupancy.To capture the equivalence of the prepayment and post—
payment approaches, plan four allows full deductibility of savings and
eliminates the preference for housing. Gains are larger, as expected. The
efficiency gain of Plan 4 relative to the current tax system is roughly
$1.5 trillion with lump—sum revenue replacement, $1350 billion with multi—21 —
plicativemarginal rate surcharges, and $1390 billion with additive marginal
rate surcharges.
Plan 5, a move halfway from the current deduction of 30 percent to the
Plan 1 deduction of 80 percent, would result in efficiency gains roughly
half those of Plan 1. Plan 6 exempts all saving from taxation, leaves the
housing preference unchanged, and results in a personal income tax subsidy
to saving. However, since this subsidy offsets the corporate income tax
which is left in place, total efficiency is enhanced relative to Plan 1.
The results from Plans 7 and 8 indicate that the U.S. could move to a
pure income tax and integrate the corporate tax with no loss in efficiency,
but that a pure income tax alone would lose efficiency. For Plan 7, the
tax base is increased since imputed income from housing is included and
existing savings deductions are eliminated. Thus, the rate structure can
be lowered rather than raised in order to maintain government revenues.
Results for Plan 7 show that moving to a pure income tax alone involves an
efficiency loss of $579 billion if marginal tax rates are not lowered. This
is primarily because the intertemporal distortions of the current system
are made worse. However, if the marginal rates are reduced, the efficiency
loss to the economy is lowered to roughly $47T billion. The improvement in
the inter—industry allocation of capital (resulting primarily from the taxa-
tion of the return to owner—occupied housing) tends to offset the deterioration
in the interteinporal efficiency (now reduced by the marginal rate adjustments).
Plan 8 is a comprehensive single level income tax plan involving corporate tax
integration as well. Such a tax system lowers revenues and thus necessitates
a rate hike to maintain the yield. When the rates are adjusted either multi—
plicatively or additively, the net efficiency impact of the package is
negligible.— 22—
Ourmodel identifies 12 household groups and includes the capability
of analyzing welfare impacts by household. In Table 3 we present welfare
impacts by household for Plan 1 (80% savings deduction). These results
need careful interpretation since we do not explicitly model life cycle
behavior. One can think of each household as an income group which at
each point in time contains several individuals at differing stages of
their life cycle. Any one individual could move among income ranges over
his or her lifetime.-'
Results by income range indicate that welfare impacts depend again on
the tax replacement. All estimates are expressed in terms of percentage
gains from the base sequence income of the group. The most regressive
pattern is given by the replacement with lump—sum taxes proportional to
base sequence incomes. Multiplicative and additive replacements yield larger
gains to low income groups since the replacement taxes impact more heavily
on those with high incomes. An interesting feature of these results is
that all three cases involve a Pareto improvement in the sense that all
household groups gain.
To test the robustness of our results for Plan 1, we have performed
some sensitivity analysis with respect to two key parameters. These results
are reported in Table 4. The efficiency gain numbers for Plan 1 (consumption
tax) are shown for three different savings elasticity values and for three
different assumptions on the exogenous real return to capital in our bench—
mark data. The latter implies a different value for the rate of time pre-
ference of each group.
In addition to the +0.4 savings elasticity used above, we have run
our simulations with savings elasticities of 0.0 and 2.0. The former is
consistent with 'tDenison's Law" (1958) and with the Howrey and Hytnans (1980)— 23—
TABLE3
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF AN 80% SAVING DEDUCTION
(Present Value of Welfare Gains as a % of Base Sequence Income for EachGroup)
Households
Classified by Types of Scaling to Preserve Tax Yield
$Thousand of
1973 Gross Income LumuSum Multiplicative Additive
$0-3 1.059 2.147 1.412
$3- 4 1.251 2.057 1.470
$4- 5 1.368 1.937 1.464
$5-6 1.440 1.891 1.477
$6-7 1.455 1.827 1.451
$7-8 1.480 1.723 1.422
$8-10 1.473 1.588 1.377
$lO-12 1.446 1.446 1.328
$12-iS 1.385 1.307 1.242
$15-20 1.302 1.061 1.137
20-25 1.256 0.916 1.088
$25+ 1.444 0.746 1.325
All Households 1.376 1.245 1.275— 24—
TABLE4
SENSITIVITY OF WELFARE EFFECTS FOR AN 80% SAVING DEDUCTION
(Present Value of Compensating Variations
over Time in Billions of 1973 Dollars)8
Types of Scaling to Preserve Tax Yield
Lump-sum Multiplicative Additive
A.SavingsElasticity




2.0 1248.607 1278.714 1278.721
(2.504) (2.564) (2.564)
B. Base Sequence Net of Tax RateofP.eturnC
0.03 1637.543 1556.911 1588.483
(2.025) (1.926) (1.965)
004b 686.167 620.652 636.002
(1.376) (1.245) (1.275)
0.05c 334.839 275.321 285.559
(0.918) (0.755) (0.783)
aThe numbers in parentheses represent the gain as a percentage of the present
discounted value of welfare (consumption plus leisure) in the base sequence. This accounts
only for the initial population.
bm5 row is also presented in Table 2.
CThe present value of income along the base sequence is sensitive to the choice of
the net of tax real rate of return to capital. For 0.03 the value is $80.9 trillion, for
0.04 the value is $49,9 trillion and for 0.05 the value is $36.5 trillion.- 25-
recalculationof Boskin's estimate, while the latter is roughly comparable
to numbers suggested by Summers (1981) as possible short—run impact savings
elasticities. The results of Table 4 indicate that the efficiency gain
increases with the savings elasticity. The results for the high elasticity
are consistent with the high range of Summers' results on welfare impacts of
intertemporal tax distortions. With an additive marginal tax surcharge, we
find that the welfare gain is $438 billion with a savings elasticity of
0.0, while it is $636 billion or $1279 billion if that parameter is 0.4 or
2.0 respectively. An interesting aspect of the results of Table 4 is that
the efficiency gain is not sensitive to the replacement tax for the case
with the saving elasticity set at 2.0. The reason is that while the move-
ment to a consumption tax initially necessitates rate increases, the high
saving elasticity implies that the economy grows sufficiently more rapidly
with a consumption tax to actually permit a lower rate structure in future
years.
Table 4 indicates greater sensitivity of results with respect to varia-
tions in the exogenously specified real net of tax rate of return to capital
in the base sequence. As previously mentioned, we specify this value as 0.04.
In the calibration of utility function parameters to the benchmark data set,
this value becomes the rate of time preference in the base sequence. Since
initial consumption losses are followed by consumption gains, it should not
be surprising that the rate of time preference is a key parameter. The
same finding appears in Summers (1981), whose large welfare impacts are
in part due to his choice of a low discount rate. Varying the implicit
discount rate between 3 percent and 5 percent changes the size of the per-
centage welfare gain by a factor of approximately two. The size of base
sequence income also changes between these cases, complicating a comparison
of absolute magnitudes.— 26—
Table5 provides information on how long the economy takes to resettle
into a steady state growth path after a tax change occurs. Once theeconomy
has completely adjusted to the new policy regime, all relative prices will
again remain constant. In the case of consumption tax proposals, the new
steady state is characterized by a higher capital intensity and a lower
relative return to capital. The results of Table 5 indicate that, for the
cases with a 0.4 savings elasticity, roughly 40 percent of the adjustment is
completed after 10 years, and 80 percent is completed after 30 years. The
economy then asymptotically approaches the new steady state growth path as
in Figure 1 above. The transition is accomplished much more rapidly with
a savings elasticity of 2.0, despite the fact that the total adjustment is
larger. Adjustments in capital/labor ratios proceed in patterns similar to
the adjustments in Table 5 price ratios.
There is a high variance of previous literature estimates on the length
of the long run. Sato (1963) and Atkinson (1969) find the adjustment to
be extremely long (greater than 100 years), while Summers (1981) and Hall
(1968) find it to be surprisingly short (around 5 years). It is difficult to
completely reconcile these various findings, but it is clear that a prime deter—
xninant is the strength of substitution effects in the model used for the
analysis.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have reported results from an analysis of a possible
switch from the existing U.S. income tax to a progressive consumption tax.
We used a dynamic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy and tax
system. Results indicate that sheltering more savings from the current U.S.
income tax could improve economic efficiency even if the necessary marginal



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ourcentral specification, the present value of welfare gains for a complete
savings deduction from the personal income tax is around $650 billion in
1973 dollars. We find that a combined policy of tax integration and savings
deduction offers the largest welfare improvement with the present value
figure lying between $1 and $1.5 trillion, even when other tax rates are
adjusted to maintain government revenue. On an annualized equivalent basis,
the latter figures are in the region of 2—3 percent of national income.
Results emphasize that while only half of net savings are currently
taxed in the U.S., this system leaves room for significant improvements. The
reason is that only certain savings vehicles are tax sheltered, particularly
owner—occupied housing. The intertemporal efficiency gain is offset by the
distortions created in the inter—industry allocation of capital.
Additional analyses with the model indicate considerable sensitivity to
the elasticity of savings with respect to the real after—tax rate of return.
Further efforts to narrow the profession's consensus on the value of this
elasticity would clearly aid policy evaluation. We also find sensitivity with
respect to the implicit rate of time preference in the model.Footnotes
1. In fact, several elements interlink in creating a number ofsources of
intertemporal inefficiency in the U.S. tax system. The income tax
embodies the double taxation feature mentioned above, but it is both
amplified in some directions and offset in others. Since nominal rather
than real returns to capital are taxed, inflation raises the effective
tax rate on the real return to capital under. the income tax. In
addition, income from capital is subject to the corporate income tax
and local property tax. On the other hand, a number of tax features
reduce effective tax rates on capital income. Savings which are
sheltered through pension funds yield tax—free capital income, as
does owner occupied housing. Both of these cases imply single rather
than double taxation of income to capital. All of these features
appear in our general equilibrium model.
2. Investors use current prices and returns as expected future prices and
returns. These expectations turn out to be correct on a balanced growth
path, but not in the transition between growth paths. An interesting
result is that tax distortions may compensate for the myopia in
expectations. If capital deepening occurs so that the future return to
capital falls, a consumption tax can result in "too much" savings under
myopic expectations. It is possible in this case that an income tax
can partially or fully offset the myopia in expectations through double
taxation of savings. In the results which follow, we do not believe
this effect to be quantitatively significant.
3. Due to the nontaxation of leisure, an income tax can be more efficient
than a consumption tax if leisure and future consumption are complements.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) note that if preferences are separable
into consumption and leisure, optimal taxation suggests a consumption
tax rather than an income tax. A feature of the present model which
complicates this result is the redistribution among households which
accompanies the tax change. The presumption that a consumption tax
will be prefereed to an income tax even in the presence of a labor—
leisure distortion nonetheless carries over to the present model since
the underlying structure is so similar to that used by Atkinson and
Stiglitz.
4. The qualified account is similar to a Keogh or Individual Retirement
Account, but with no ceilings and no constraints other than the taxation
of withdrawals. The Blueprints proposal would also eliminate medical,
charitable, and state and local tax deductions. It would include social
security benefits as income and it would eliminate the standard deduction.
The rate structure would include only three brackets with a top marginal
rate of 40 percent, designed to preserve revenue in 1976.It is esti-
mated that the tax base would be 23 percent more than under the current
income tax, but 7 percent less than under a comprehensive income tax
(without the savings deduction). While we have not captured base—
broadening features of the Blueprints proposal, we have used the con-
cept of an income tax with deduction for savings.- F2-
5.There is in fact some disagreement on this point. A strict Haig—
Simons definition of income as consumption plus change in net worth
would tax inheritances and gifts received while giving a deduction
to the donor (or his estate in the settlement of final year taxes).
The Carter Commission (1966), however, advocated taxing inheritances
with no deduction.
6. Though the consumption tax itself may be easy to administer, the
transition to a consumption tax may be difficult. When first enacted,
for example, the qualified account might be used not just for new
savings but for the transfer of existing savings. In any case, our
model does not include any of these administrative costs.
7. A more detailed presentation of an earlier single period version of
this model appears in Fullerton, Shoven, and Whally (1978), and
further discussion of the dynamic version used in the present paper
appears in Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (1981).
8.A similar conclusion is also suggested by Stern (1976).
9.We recognize the biases introducted by using a single aggregate
elasticity, but the current model cannot accept parameter differences
based on age or sex. It could accept different elasticity parameters
for each of our income groups, but these are not readily available.
10. Because each vehicle has a different ceiling on the contributions which
can be deducted each year, and because of nonconstant savings propensities,
the proportion of marginal savings which are deductible may not be the
same as the average proportion of savings deducted. Later simulations
of tax plans with different deductible proportions provide results which
are similar in nature to those that v.'ould be obtained with different
porportions deductible in the benchmark.
11. See Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (1981) for detials of this plan.
12. If we had a complete life—cycle utility function of the form
U =U(H...11T)with the possibility of substitution among H in
different periods, then compensation sufficient to reach the old U
could be less than compensation required to reach the old pattern of
H.Our equation (1) for U is not of this form, but allows simple
calculation of savings and instantaneous utility H from current prices
in each period of the sequence. Our welfare measure may be biased for
this reason.
13. The distorting effect on intertemporal choices is affected to varying
degrees by these tax replacements but is entirely eliminated in the
pure consumption tax example. Distorting effects on labor/leisure
choices remain and are further affected by raising marginal rates.
14. A further problem is that the highest income group saves a high
proporation of income in the 1973 data, while the lowest income group
actually dissaves. If we allowed each group to retain its own
savings, then the rich would get richer and the poor would get poorer.
In fact, of course, high income individuals often retire to a lower
income bracket and take their wealth with them. To approximate this- F3-
movementof wealth and to insure balanced growth in the benchmark
sequence, the model takes total savings at the end of any period
and reallocates it in proportion to the capital holdings of each
group. This reallocation of wealth detracts from the confidence
we place in the model's distributional results.References
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